Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned of a risk that the U.S. could use military force following a new terrorist designation [1].
The move signals a significant shift in how the U.S. views organized crime in South America. By classifying criminal factions as terrorists rather than mere drug trafficking organizations, the U.S. expands its legal toolkit for sanctions and intelligence operations, but it also creates friction regarding Brazilian national sovereignty.
On May 28, 2026, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced the decision to designate two criminal groups as terrorist organizations [2]. The classification became official on June 5, 2026 [1]. The two groups targeted are the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and the Comando Vermelho (CV) [3].
Itamaraty issued its warning on June 5, 2026, the same day the designation took effect [1]. The ministry said that the classification could open the legal possibility for the U.S. to consider military action against these groups on Brazilian soil [1].
However, the U.S. government has pushed back against the notion that this designation leads to boots on the ground. The U.S. State Department said the classification does not authorize any military action in Brazil [1]. The department said that U.S. law is clear regarding the limitations of such designations [1].
Despite the U.S. denials, the Brazilian government remains cautious. The PCC and CV are among the most powerful criminal organizations in the region, controlling vast networks of drug trafficking, and territorial influence. The risk, according to Itamaraty, lies in the precedent set by designating non-state actors as terrorists, which historically has provided a legal basis for extraterritorial military operations in other global contexts [1].
“Itamaraty warned of a 'risk' that the United States could use military force.”
The tension between the U.S. and Brazil highlights a clash between security imperatives and sovereignty. While the U.S. views the designation as a legal mechanism to disrupt the financial and operational networks of the PCC and CV, Brazil views it as a potential loophole for unilateral military intervention. This disagreement underscores the complexity of combating transnational organized crime when the legal definitions of 'criminal' and 'terrorist' differ between allied nations.
