Mexican legislatures approved a constitutional reform on Friday to postpone judicial elections originally scheduled for 2026 until 2028 [1, 2].
This shift alters the timeline for a controversial transition toward a system where federal judges are chosen by popular vote. The delay reflects a strategic move by Morena party legislators to avoid holding the elections this year [1, 3].
The measure received approval from 25 legislative bodies [1]. During an extraordinary session of the Senate, lawmakers passed a total of three reforms [1]. The process took place within the Mexican Congress of the Union, marking a significant pivot in the country's legal restructuring [1, 2].
Despite the reported approvals, some reports suggest the reform's status remains uncertain. One account said the measure to postpone the election to 2028 would remain in limbo and was not included in the pending agenda [3].
The broader judicial overhaul has faced significant criticism from international observers. Human Rights Watch said, "The constitutional reform that replaces half of the federal judiciary with judges elected by popular vote has undermined judicial independence."
Concerns regarding the viability of the popular vote system were further highlighted by recent data. A report indicated that participation in the first judicial elections reached only around 13% [4]. This low turnout has been described as a final questioning of the reform process [4].
Legislators from the Morena party have driven the strategy to push the date to 2028 to ensure the process is managed according to their objectives [1, 3]. The move continues to spark debate over the stability and autonomy of the Mexican federal court system.
“The constitutional reform that replaces half of the federal judiciary with judges elected by popular vote has undermined judicial independence.”
The postponement of judicial elections suggests a struggle to implement a high-stakes transition to a populist judiciary. By pushing the vote to 2028, the Morena-led government may be attempting to mitigate the political risk associated with the low 13% turnout seen in early iterations of the reform, while simultaneously extending the period of legal uncertainty regarding the independence of the federal courts.
