Terrorist attacks and organized crime are spilling from the Sahel region into the coastal states of the Gulf of Benin [1].
This expansion threatens to destabilize previously stable coastal economies and complicates regional security as jihadist networks move toward the Atlantic coast.
Groups including Jama’at Nusrat al‑Islam wal‑Muslimin (JNIM), as well as other extremists linked to al‑Qaida and the Islamic State, are driving this shift [2]. A United Nations spokesperson said that terrorism and organized crime by these groups are a “pervasive threat” in Africa's volatile Sahel region and are spilling into neighboring areas [3].
The threat has already manifested in specific regional incursions. Reports indicated that northern Benin faced rising terrorism in early March 2024 [4]. The spillover is characterized by a blend of ideological warfare and organized criminal activity, creating a complex security environment for local governments [1].
Responses to the crisis vary across the region. Some reports suggest that regional security cooperation is the most credible response to the growing threat [5]. However, other perspectives indicate that some governments prefer to continue accusing foreign countries rather than directly facing the threat [6].
Criticism has also targeted the role of foreign interventions. In Benin, the presence of the French military has faced growing criticism as the security situation in the north deteriorates [4]. The volatility of the region is further highlighted by past high-profile incidents, such as the capture of Canadian diplomat Robert Fowler, who was held captive for 130 days [7].
Security forces in the Gulf of Benin countries, including Nigeria and Benin, now face the challenge of containing these networks before they establish permanent bases in the coastal belt [1].
“Terrorism and organized crime... are a “pervasive threat” in Africa's volatile Sahel region”
The southward migration of Sahelian extremists represents a strategic shift in West African instability. By moving from the landlocked Sahel toward the Gulf of Benin, these groups gain potential access to maritime trade routes and new recruitment pools in coastal populations. This transition forces coastal states to pivot their defense strategies from internal policing to counter-insurgency, while the friction between regional cooperation and distrust of foreign military presence may hinder a unified response.
