International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi said diluting Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) stock is one of the solutions being considered.

This proposal represents a critical attempt to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. If the material is diluted, it becomes less viable for use in a weapon, potentially easing international tensions over Iran's nuclear capabilities.

Grossi discussed the technical options during a press briefing at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria. He said that the dilution of the HEU stock is among the solutions currently under discussion to manage the material. The goal of these measures is to ensure Iran complies with its nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

While technical solutions are being debated, a diplomatic stalemate remains regarding the physical location of the uranium. Reports from May 21, 2026 [1], indicate that the U.S. has urged Iran to move its HEU out of the country. However, Iranian officials said the material will remain inside the country, citing orders from Supreme Leader Khamenei.

Negotiations continue to focus on technical alternatives to resolve this impasse. A U.S. State Department spokesperson said on May 29, 2026 [2], that discussions are focusing on options, including possible dilution, to reduce the proliferation risk.

These efforts follow a series of high-level diplomatic exchanges throughout May 2026. The IAEA continues to monitor the stockpile to ensure that no material is diverted for purposes other than peaceful energy production. The agency's role remains central to verifying that any agreed-upon dilution process is executed fully and transparently.

Dilution of the highly‑enriched uranium stock is among the solutions under discussion.

The shift toward discussing 'dilution' suggests a pragmatic compromise between the U.S. demand for the total removal of HEU and Iran's refusal to export the material. By reducing the enrichment level of the uranium while keeping it on Iranian soil, both parties may find a technical middle ground that lowers the immediate threat of a nuclear weapon without requiring Iran to cede physical control of its assets.