Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has designated all commercial operations and infrastructure owned by Elon Musk in West Asia as legitimate military targets [1].
This escalation marks a direct threat against private U.S. corporate assets in the Middle East, potentially expanding the scope of regional conflict to include non-state commercial entities. The move signals Iran's willingness to target the physical infrastructure of global technology firms if it perceives them as tools of foreign intelligence or military support.
According to Iranian state media, the IRGC's new target list includes SpaceX’s Starlink satellite network and its associated ground stations [1], [2]. The IRGC spokesperson said, "All commercial operations, infrastructure and economic holdings managed by Elon Musk in West Asia will now be treated as legitimate military targets" [2].
Tehran justifies the designation by stating that Musk’s private assets are being used to support adversaries of the Iranian state [1]. The IRGC said these assets now constitute hostile infrastructure that warrants a military response [1].
While the IRGC threatens to bomb these sites, reports indicate a contradiction in how the technology is currently handled within the country. Some reports suggest that Iranians continue to use the Starlink service even during nationwide communications blackouts [1].
State media confirmed that the decision to expand the target list was announced Thursday [1]. The IRGC spokesperson said, "Iran has added Elon Musk’s companies to its list of military targets" [1].
“"All commercial operations, infrastructure and economic holdings managed by Elon Musk in West Asia will now be treated as legitimate military targets."”
The designation of commercial tech infrastructure as military targets reflects the growing role of satellite internet in geopolitical conflicts. By targeting Starlink, Iran is attempting to disrupt the communication capabilities that adversaries or dissident groups use to bypass state-controlled internet filters. However, the continued use of the service within Iran suggests a gap between the IRGC's strategic threats and the actual operational reality on the ground.
