Congress senior leader Abhishek Manu Singhvi said the anti-defection law in India is being sidestepped to facilitate political party switching [1].

The stability of Indian governance depends on the integrity of legislative mandates. When elected representatives abandon their party platforms, it undermines the democratic will of the voters, and creates instability within state and national governments.

In an interview with journalist Rajdeep Sardesai, Singhvi said the normalization of defection politics is occurring [1]. He focused on how the Tenth Schedule of the Indian Constitution [2], which was designed to prevent political instability by penalizing legislators who switch parties, is currently being abused by political rebels [2].

Singhvi said that the process of switching parties is often driven by two primary factors: the influence of money and the use of investigative agencies [1]. According to Singhvi, the pressure from these agencies encourages representatives to leave their original parties to avoid legal or financial scrutiny.

This pattern of behavior suggests that the legal safeguards intended to maintain party discipline are no longer effective against high-level political maneuvering [1]. Singhvi said that the current environment allows for the bypassing of the Tenth Schedule, effectively rendering the anti-defection law toothless in the face of strategic political pressure [2].

The conversation highlighted a growing vulnerability in the political system where the ability to sway legislators through external pressure outweighs the legal consequences of defection [1]. Singhvi said there is a need for ways to curb this practice to protect the mandate of the electorate.

The anti-defection law is being sidestepped to facilitate political party switching.

The erosion of the Tenth Schedule indicates a shift in Indian parliamentary dynamics where individual legislators are more susceptible to executive pressure and financial incentives than party loyalty. If the anti-defection law continues to be bypassed, the predictability of government majorities will decrease, potentially leading to more frequent collapses of state governments and a decrease in the value of the voter's party-specific mandate.