A South Korean appeals court reduced former Prime Minister Han Duck-soo's prison sentence from 23 years to 15 years on Thursday [1], [2].

The ruling underscores the legal accountability of high-ranking officials who facilitate the improper exercise of presidential power, even when acting under direct orders.

The Seoul High Court issued the decision on May 7, 2026 [4]. Han was found guilty of rebellion and insurrection for his role in the brief imposition of martial law in December 2024 [2], [3]. That declaration was ordered by former President Yoon Suk-yeol.

The court's judgment highlighted the "duty to control the president's wrong exercise of authority" [1]. This obligation suggests that the Prime Minister's role is not merely administrative but includes a constitutional check on executive overreach.

A court spokesperson said the sentence was reduced to reflect Han's partial responsibility while acknowledging mitigating factors [2]. Despite the reduction, the court maintained that the actions taken during the martial law episode constituted a serious breach of the nation's constitutional order.

Legal analyst Lee Eun-jin said Han Duck-soo's role in the brief martial-law episode was a serious breach of constitutional order [3]. The original 23-year sentence [1] had been viewed as a landmark penalty for a civilian official involved in an insurrection charge.

The ruling comes as South Korea continues to process the legal fallout from the December 2024 events. The court's decision to lower the term from 23 years [1] to 15 years [1] reflects a judicial balancing act between the severity of the crime and the specific level of the defendant's culpability.

The court reduced the sentence to reflect Han’s partial responsibility while acknowledging mitigating factors.

The reduction of Han Duck-soo's sentence signals a judicial effort to distinguish between the primary instigator of the martial law declaration and those who facilitated it. However, by upholding a 15-year term, the court reinforces the precedent that high-ranking officials cannot avoid criminal liability for 'following orders' if those orders violate the constitutional order.