The United Arab Emirates trained hundreds of Colombian private military contractors to fight alongside the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan [1], [2].
This deployment suggests a coordinated effort by the UAE to influence the Sudanese civil war by providing specialized combat personnel. The involvement of foreign mercenaries complicates international efforts to reach a peace agreement and raises concerns regarding the legality of these operations under international law.
According to a report published May 25, 2026 [3], the recruitment process began in 2024 [1]. These contractors were hired by the Global Security Services Group, known as GSSG [1], [2]. The report said that the recruits received training on military bases within the United Arab Emirates before being deployed to Sudan [1], [3].
Once in Sudan, these fighters were integrated into the operations of the Rapid Support Forces. Specific deployments included activity in El Fasher [1], [4]. Human Rights Watch said the UAE sought to boost the capacity of the RSF to commit war crimes by providing these trained mercenaries [1], [3].
This pipeline of fighters from South America to East Africa represents a significant shift in how private military companies operate across borders. The use of UAE bases as training hubs for foreign fighters intended for a third-party conflict indicates a high level of state coordination, or at least tacit approval, of the GSSG activities [1], [2].
Investigators are currently examining the link between these contractors and reported atrocities in Sudan. The report said the UAE was a central actor in facilitating the movement of these fighters from Bogotá to El Fasher [1], [4].
“The UAE trained hundreds of Colombian private military contractors to fight alongside the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan.”
The use of Colombian mercenaries trained in the UAE to support the RSF indicates a sophisticated geopolitical strategy to maintain influence in Sudan. By utilizing a private security firm as a proxy, the UAE can project military power and support a specific faction while attempting to maintain a layer of plausible deniability. This pattern increases the risk of prolonged conflict and potential accountability for war crimes under the principle of state responsibility.
